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LeFevre: LeFevre: Whose Finding Is It Anyway

Whose Finding is it Anyway?: The
Division of Labor Between Courts and
Arbitrators with Respect to Waiver
Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the emphasis with which the Supreme Court has made clear its policy
favoring arbitration, it is not surprising that some courts may have reacted by divesting themselves of a "gateway issue" long decided by courts. Traditionally,
courts have determined whether a party has acted inconsistently with its right to
arbitration, thereby waiving it, but a few courts found that the question is properly
before an arbitrator. Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corporation2 established a framework through which the
federal circuits may begin to close the potential split of authority regarding waiver
of the right to arbitration. This framework distinguishes between waiver by litigation conduct and waiver by delay or other contractual limitation, maintaining the
former for judicial review, and delegating the latter to arbitrators. While it is
likely that Marie will become the rule, an alternative may exist in a separate set of
equitable defenses, avoiding the confusion that comes from distinguishing between different forms of waiver.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff-Appellee Martha M. Marie (Marie) filed a discrimination charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on April 23, 2003,
alleging sexual discrimination by her employer, Defendant-Appellant Allied
Home Mortgage Corporation (Allied), and her supervisor, Joseph Thompson
(Thompson),3 in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 Allied
responded to the charge on May 22, 2003, after which the EEOC conducted an
investigation.5 On July 18, 2003, the EEOC issued a "right to sue ' 6 letter to
1.402 F.3d 1 (Ist Cir. 2005).
2. Id.
3. The EEOC dismissal letter indicates that Marie and her supervisor, Joseph Thompson, lived
together and represented themselves as domestic partners. Id. at 5.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000); Marie, 402 F.3d at 4-5. Marie, a loan processor for
Allied, specifically alleged that Thompson physically and verbally abused her in an effort to divert her
loan origination commission to himself, forced her to engage in an illegal "autodialing" scheme, and
made her pay for office supplies out of her own pocket. Id. at 4. Marie alleged thht Allied had knowledge of these incidents and failed to act. Id.
5. Marie, 402 F.3d at 5.
6. Actions for discrimination in employment under Title VII must first be investigated by the
EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). After the EEOC determines, either by finding "no cause" or treating
the issue as unsuccessful conciliation with the employer, that it will not proceed itself, the Commission
will issue the complainant a letter detailing that person's rights, including the right to file suit. See
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Marie, dismissing her EEOC claims.. Marie then filed suit in Massachusetts state
court alleging the same violations of Title VII, and Allied removed the case to the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 8 In district court,
Allied defended by moving to compel arbitration, pursuant to the terms of Marie's
employment contract requiring that all disputes be submitted to arbitration. 9 The
district court denied the motion, and Allied subsequently
0 filed its notice of interlocutory appeal, which was taken up in the instant case.l
The district court advanced two reasons for denying Allied's motion to compel arbitration." First, the district court interpreted a time limitation provision in
Marie's employment contract to mean that Allied had failed to timely initiate arbitration.' 2 The court reasoned that, pursuant to the terms of the contract, arbitration
"must be initiated within sixty days of the ... occurrence about which the party
initiating the arbitration is complaining."' 3 Because Allied sought arbitration
more than sixty days after the EEOC concluded its proceedings, 14 Allied's motion
to compel arbitration was untimely under the terms of Marie's employment agreement.'5 Second, the district court held that Allied
had "waived" its right to arbi16
trate the claims largely because of this delay.
On appeal, Allied argued that the district court erred in making any determination or finding whatsoever with respect to the contractual time limitation or
waiver. 17 Rather, Allied argued, both questions should have been left to an arbiDavid Sherwin, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration:
A New Pathfor EmpiricalResearch, 57 STAN. L.REv. 1557, 1585 (2005); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
7. Marie, 402 F.3d at 5. The EEOC dismissed Marie's charges, noting that her relationship with
Thompson was consensual rather than unwelcome, that Thompson's actions were motivated by his
personal relationship with Marie, not by her gender, and that Marie failed to utilize Allied's sexual
harassment policy. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The relevant portion of the employment contract entered into by Marie and Allied states:
Employer and Employee agree to submit to final and binding arbitration any and all disputes,
claims (whether in tort, contract, statutory, or otherwise), and disagreements concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement and Employee's employment by Employer including the arbitrability of any such controversy or claim ....Arbitration under this section must be
initiated within sixty days of the action, inaction or occurrence about which the party initiating
the arbitration is complaining.
Id. at 4.
10. Id. Allied did not appeal from this order specifically, but rather appealed from the denial of a
subsequent motion to reconsider based on FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), filed on January 26, 2004. Id. Because Allied did not file its notice of appeal until March 12, 2004, that is, more than 30 days after the
denial of the motion to compel arbitration, the First Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed the jurisdictional question raised and ultimately resolved it in favor of Allied. Id.at 6, 9.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id.
14. The EEOC issued a "Dismissal and Notice of Rights" on July 18, 2003, whereas Allied did not
seek arbitration until December 23, 2003, over five months later. See id., at 5.
15. Id. The district court proffered this reason in its original order denying Allied's motion to compel arbitration. Id. In that order, the district court stated: "It being undisputed that the initiation of
arbitration proceedings occurred ...
more than sixty days after the conclusion of [the] charge proceedings before the [EEOC], the demand for arbitration is untimely under Article V of plaintiff's employment agreement." Id. at 5.
16. Id. This reason for denying Allied's motion to compel arbitration was contained in the court's
order denying Allied's motion to reconsider the prior denial. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 11.
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trator.18 While conceding that the general rule is that issues of procedural arbitrability are presumptively for an arbitrator to decide and issues of substantive arbitrability are for courts,' 9 Marie argued that waiver remains an issue for a court to
determine, because courts have more expertise in judicial procedures. 2 ° Allied
argued, alternatively, that if the appellate court found the issue of waiver to be
presumptively for a court, that presumption was overcome in this case by the
terms of the arbitration agreement, which provided that any disputes concerning
general arbitrability issues should be submitted to an arbitrator.2'
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court
and remanded the case for arbitration.22 The court held that, because a contractual
time limitation is a procedural question presumptively for the arbitrator, and because there was no evidence to rebut the presumption, the issue must be resolved
by an arbitrator. 23 With respect to waiver though, the court found that courts possess more expertise in judicial procedures, and it would be inefficient for an arbitrator to decide the issue of waiver by conduct in litigation. 24 Thus, the court held
that such questions are properly before a judge.25 On the merits, the court held
that failing to initiate arbitration during the pendency 26of EEOC proceedings does
not constitute waiver of a contractual right to arbitrate.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prior to two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, federal appellate
and district courts have primarily decided the equitable defense of waiver themselves, rather than delegating the question to arbitrators.27 Whether because the
28
the division of
power to do so was assumed, or because no party questioned it,
labor in this respect between courts and arbitrators was not questioned until the
Supreme Court's decisions in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.29 and Green
Tree FinancialCorp. v. Bazzle. 30 Following these decisions, a few courts moved
18. See id.at14-15.
19. See id. at 10 n.7 (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002)).
Howsam identified such procedural issues as "time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions
precedent to an obligation to arbitrate. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85 (citing RUAA § 6, comment 2).
These issues are for arbitrators, while only two questions, termed questions of substantive arbitrability,
are for courts: whether the parties are bound to an arbitration agreement, and whether the agreement
covers a particular dispute. See id. at 83-84.
20. See Marie, 402 F.3d at 14-15.
21. Id. at 14.
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at 15.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 16.
27. See generally Philip Aidikoff, Arbitration: Can it be Waived?, in SECURITIEs ARBITRATION
2002: TAKING CONTROL OF THE PROCESS, at 531 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Series
No. 1326, 2002) [hereinafter Aidikoff].
28. See Marie, 402 F.3d at 12. The court raises the possibility that the recent stream of First Circuit
cases that continuing to adhere to the traditional waiver rule, discussed infra, have done so because no
party raised the issue of Howsam's impact on the traditional rule. Id.
29. 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
30. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). See generally Aidikoff, supra note 27. The impact of the Howsam and
Green Tree decisions is discussed below.
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away from aplying traditional rules of waiver, and instead reserved the issue for
an arbitrator.
A. Tests of Waiver Priorto Howsam and Green Tree
Nearly every federal circuit court has adjudicated questions of waiver by litigation conduct, irrespective of whence that power came or whether they had that
power in the first place. 32 Generally, courts utilize a three-part test for determining if the particular facts suggest waiver of the right to arbitrate: (1) knowledge of
an existing right to arbitrate, (2) acts inconsistent with that right, and (3) resulting
prejudice to the opposing party. 33 Where courts differ is in the application of
prongs two and three, that is, how much prejudice or how many inconsistent acts
are required to constitute
waiver. 34 As a result, the general rule varies slightly
35
circuit.
to
from circuit
Some circuits focus more on the prejudice element, requiring the party defending a motion to compel arbitration to show the movant has "substantially36
invoke[d] the judicial process to the prejudice or detriment of the other party."
In S&H Contractors,Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Company,37 for instance, the Eleventh
Circuit found that Taft was prejudiced where S&H, the party who sought to compel arbitration, waited eight months, filed two motions, and took five depositions
before invoking the contractual right to arbitrate the dispute.38 Consequently, the
court found S&H had waived its right to arbitration. 39 Central to the court's rea4
soning was the great expense Taft incurred as result of S&H's litigation conduct. 0
Applying a similar test, and again noting the expense incurred, the Second Circuit
in Com-tec Associates v. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc.,41 found that a party to
litigation had waived the right to arbitrate the dispute after "extensively deposing"
42
its party opponents and engaging in eighteen months of "protracted litigation."

31. See PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION

LAW § 20:105 (Supp. Aug. 2005) (identifying the same two divergent cases as in Marie: Nat'l Am.
Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 328 F.3d 462 (8th Cir. 2003), and Belleview Drug
Co. v. Advance PCS, 333 F. Supp.2d 318 (E.D. Pa. 2004)).
32. For a catalogue of federal and state cases involving waiver of arbitration, see Joel E. Smith,
Annotation, Defendant's Participationin Action as Waiver of Right to Arbitrationof Dispute Involved
Therein, 98 A.L.R.3d 767 (1980 & Supp. 2005). The source of a court's power to hear questions of
waiver by litigation conduct is key to understanding the distinction that the Marie court made between
the two types of waiver, and is discussed more fully below.
33. Aidikoff, supra note 27, at 533.
34. Id.
35. See Aidikoff, supra note 27.
36. Stone v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 898 F.2d 1542, 1543 (11 th Cir. 1990) (citing Miller Brewing Co. v.
Fort Worth Distributing Co., 781 F.2d 494,497 (5th Cir. 1986)).
37. 906 F.2d 1507 (11 th Cir. 1990).
38. Id. at 1514.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 938 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1991).

42. Id. at 1576-77. The court in Com-Tec phrased the waiver test as follows: "Mere delay in seeking
arbitration, absent prejudice to the opposing party does not constitute waiver... However, 'litigation
of substantial issues going to the merits may constitute a waiver of arbitration."' Id. at 1576 (internal
citations omitted).
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Other circuits focus their waiver inquiry on the acts of the movant that are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate, and are less concerned with actual prejudice. 43 In Ritzel Communications, Inc. v. Mid-American Cellular Telephone
Company,44 the Eighth Circuit found that the party seeking arbitration engaged in
"substantial, active invocation of the litigation process" by filing a motion to dismiss a cross-claim or, in the alternative, to sever the claims for a separate trial.45
The court found these acts constituted a choice to proceed in a judicial forum, and
therefore also constitute an abandonment of the arbitral forum. 46 Rather than
discussing the subjective impact of such litigation conduct upon the non-moving
party, the court analyzed the objective act of foregoing a known right, stating
simply that the prejudice in the Ritzel case was "obvious and substantial. 47
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia uses an approach similar to
that of the Eighth Circuit, and in Nat'l Foundationfor Cancer Research v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc.,a4 found that arbitration was waived where the moving party
filed an answer with multiple affirmative defenses, participated in discovery, and
moved for summary judgment.49 Concentrating on the objective acts of the
movant, "[t]he essential question [in the D.C. Circuit] is whether ... the defaulting
party has acted inconsistently with the arbitration right., 50 The Seventh Circuit
went even further and expressly abandoned the need for any showing of prejudice. 5' In order to defend a motion to compel arbitration, Seventh Circuit courts
require only that the moving party has demonstrated an election to proceed in a
judicial forum in order to presume that arbitration was waived.52
Throughout each of these cases, and indeed across all circuits prior to
Howsam and Green Tree, there run two important themes. First, in each case in
which the court determined that the party seeking to compel arbitration had
waived that right, it was litigation activity that provided the impetus for the court's
decision.53 The mere passage of time was never enough. 54 Second, each of these
courts framed their power to make the waiver determination in terms of abuse of
the legal system. 55 The abuse generally takes two forms: the creation of undue
expense, or forum shopping. For instance, in Com-Tec, the forbidden acts of the
movant were called "maneuvers" that caused delay and created undue expense. 6
Even in the Seventh Circuit, where the prejudice requirement was eliminated, the
43. See Aidikoff, supra note 27, at 548-51. These decisions still include an element of "prejudice,"
but the emphasis is on the "inconsistent act."
44. 989 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1993).
45. Id. at 969.
46. See id. at 970-71.
47. Id. The Eighth Circuit had maintained a "prejudice" requirement, and in at least one case has
found "inconsistent acts," but not "prejudice." See Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Freeman, 924 F.2d 157,
159 (8th Cir. 1991).
48. 821 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 774-75.
50. Id.
51. Aidikoff, supra note 27, at 552-53.
52. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding
waiver where movant removed the case to federal court before invoking the right to arbitration).
53. See Aidikoff, supra note 27 at 533-53; see also Smith, supra note 32.
54. See, e.g., Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Freeman, 924 F.2d 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1991) ("Delay in seeking to compel arbitration does not itself constitute waiver.").
55. See generally Bruner & O'Connor, supra note 31.
56. Com-tec Assocs. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 938 F.2d 1574, 1576-77 (2d Cir. 1991).
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moving party's conduct was described as "not a choice between remedies.. .but
the selection of the forum," 57 indicating that the waiver defense operates to prevent the abusive practice of forum shopping.
While in most circuits the source of a court's power to review waiver went
58
largely unchallenged, the Second Circuit in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Distajo
brought attention to the jurisdictional oddity.59 In a stunning display of the Socratic method, however, the court asked only questions and failed to provide a
satisfactory answer. 60 In Distajo, the court noted the peculiarity of courts ruling
on waiver issues given the fairly clear terms of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA). 61 The FAA created a substantive body of federal law which declared arbitration clauses "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ...... 62 The Supreme Court,
interpreting the FAA, stressed that it reflects a strong federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. 6 3 Section 3 of the FAA permits a party to move the court for a
stay of proceedings so that the cause may be referred to arbitration, "providing the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration." 64 Section 4, which commands federal district courts to compel arbitration, contains no
such provision allowing the court to examine the moving party's conduct,65 but
courts have routinely made such determinations in section 4 proceedings. 66
The Distajocourt commented on the discrepancy by making this observation:
"It would appear that the waiver defense has slowly been transformed from a
statutorily mandated inquiry in section 3 cases.., into a broader equitable defense
in section 4 cases." 67 Waiver as an equitable defense to a motion to compel under
section 3, however, was limited solely to litigation activity under the reasoning of
Distajo.68 The court identified a distinction made in the Second Circuit whereby
waiver defenses based upon mere delay are reserved for arbitrators, but waiver by
conduct in a judicial tribunal is heard by the court. 69 Again, without reaching a
conclusion as to why courts have the power to make that determination,70 the court
remanded the case to the district court to adjudicate the waiver defense.
B. The Analysis of Howsam and Green Tree
The federal circuits later diverged from their fairly consistent waiver analysis,
particularly in their attempts to interpret the Supreme Court's discussion of arbi57. Cabinetree of Wis., Inc., 50 F.3d at 390.
58. 66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995).
59. See id. at 453-57.
60. See id. at 455-56.
61. Id.; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
62. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
63. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
64. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at § 4.
66. See Aidikoff, supra note 27, at 536-53; see also Smith, supra note 32.
67. Distajo, 66 F.3d at 456.
68. Id. at 456-57.
69. Distajo, 66 F.3d at 456 (citing Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 67 (2d Cir.
1983)).
70. Id. at 457. For further review of various forms of the waiver defense rule in the federal circuits,
see Matthew Forsythe, The Treatment ArbitrationWaivers Under FederalLaw, Disp. RESOL. J. MAY
2000, at 8.
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trability in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.7 1 and Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle. 72 Howsam held that the question of a six-year time limitation for
arbitration that was contained in the arbitration agreement was a question for an
arbitrator.73 In its opinion, the Supreme Court first reiterated that arbitration is a
matter of contract, and courts should therefore generally leave any questions relating to arbitration to arbitrators. 74 The narrow exception to this rule is "questions
of arbitrability," which are those issues that parties would likely expect a court to
have decided the condition precedent.75 The presumption, then, is that arbitrators
should decide "procedural" questions like allegations of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability, and courts should decide "substantive" issues such as
fraud, in the creation of the arbitration clause. 76 The Supreme Court relied on the
comments to the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) which state that prerequisites such as time limitations are for arbitrators to decide.77
The question in Green Tree was whether the arbitration agreement at issue
contemplated class-wide arbitration.78 The underlying issue, then, was which
adjudicator should make that determination. 79 The Supreme Court, noting the
narrow interpretation of "arbitrability" in Howsam, held that the question was for
the arbitrator.80 In determining which forum the parties likely expected to hear the
class-arbitration question, the Court examined the relative expertise of courts versus arbitrators. 8 ' The kind of proceeding the parties agreed to, the Court found,
concerned neither the validity of the arbitration clause, nor the clause's applicability to a particular dispute, nor did it implicate judicial procedures. 82 Instead, because arbitrators are well-equipped to deal with contract interpretation and arbitration procedures, the Court reasoned, the issue of class arbitration should go to
the arbitrator.83
C. The Subsequent Split of Authority
In the wake of Howsam and Green Tree, several courts have reversed their
positions with respect to waiver by litigation conduct, and have given all questions
of waiver to arbitrators. 84 Other federal courts, though, either have not directly
addressed these two cases, continuing to apply their traditional waiver rules, or
have distinguished them, again maintaining the status quo. 85 In Nat'l Am. Ins. Co.
71.
72.
73.
74.

537 U.S. 79 (2002).
539 U.S. 444 (2003).
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 83.

75. Id. at 84. The Court notes that the "question of arbitrability," also called "substantive arbitrabil-

ity," has been applied to situations such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all,
or whether the agreement encompasses a certain kind of claim. Id.
76. Id. at 84-85.
77. Id.
78. Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 447.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 453.
81. Id. at 452-53.
82. Id. at 452.
83. Id. at 453.
84. See BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 31.

85. Id. As discussed in subsection A, above, the status quo is slightly different in each Circuit.
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v. TransamericaOccidental Life Ins. Co.,86 the petitioner argued before the Eighth
Circuit that, because respondent chose to litigate in state court other disputes involving the same contracts, respondent thereby waived its right to arbitrate the
instant dispute. 87 The Eighth Circuit summarily dismissed this argument with
little discussion, but cited Howsam for the proposition that "the presumption is
that the arbitrator should decide allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability. ' 88 In Belleview Drug Co. v. Advance PCS,89 the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania similarly found that, in light of Howsam, waiver is presumptively
for an arbitrator to decide, even in cases where, as in Marie, waiver is implicated
by litigation activity such as a contentious motion to dismiss. 90 Neither court
examined the policy reasons behind Howsam, nor did they address the likely expectations of the parties as the Howsam court did.9 '
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, came to the opposite conclusion in Tristar Fin. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Equicredit Corp. of Am. 92 The court first stated its
version of the rule from Howsam that courts, rather than arbitrators, should decide
questions of arbitrability "where contracting parties would likely have expected a
court to have decided the gateway matter." 93 Given that courts are in the better
position to decide whether litigation conduct constitutes a waiver, the court reasoned, parties would expect a court to make such a determination. 94 Consistent
with the Fifth Circuit rule prior to Howsam, the court found that where the only
evidence of waiver was delay in compelling arbitration and participation in limited discovery, arbitration should be compelled.95
These three cases represent a potential split in authority between those circuits that send all questions of waiver to arbitrators, and those that will reach the
merits of such a defense. While the full impact of these cases on waiver is yet
unknown, the First Circuit recently made a good case for judicial adjudication.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Co.,9 6 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
examined the role of courts in two areas. Briefly analyzing a contractual time
limitation on when a party could seek arbitration, the court first held that the district court erred in interpreting the complained-of contract provision. 97 The court
86. 328 F.3d 462 (8th Cir. 2003).
87. Id. at 466.
88. Id. (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. 79) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
89. 333 F. Supp.2d 318 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
90. Id. at 324-25 (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84). Interestingly enough, after the court found that
waiver is presumptively for an arbitrator to decide, the district court noted that Third Circuit opinions
since Howsam continued to address the merits of a waiver defense. Id. (citing Paicko v. Airborne
Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 596-97 (3d Cir. 2004)). The district court then resolved the instant waiver
issue on the merits, finding no waiver. Id.
91. See Nat'l Am Ins. Co., 328 F.3d at 466; Belleview Drug Co., 333 F. Supp.2d at 324-25.
92. 97 Fed. Appx. 462, 464 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83).
93. Id. (quoting Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 463-64 (citing Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir.
1986)).
96. 402 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
97. Id. at 11.
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reasoned it was likely that an arbitrator would be expected to have the expertise
required to determine the meaning of such contract terms, especially given the
"background norms in this employment area." 98 Deciding this type of procedural
provision, the Marie court wrote, "would entangle the court in issues that may go
properly to the merits of the dispute," thereby depriving the parties of their bargain to arbitrate. 99 A time limitation, be it contractual as in the instant case, or
arbitrator-imposed as in Howsam, l0 is precisely the type of procedural prerequisite that is presumed to be decided by the arbitrator.'l 1
More significantly, the court next examined the role of courts in adjudicating
allegations of waiver of a known right to arbitration in defense of a motion to stay
the instant proceedings and compel arbitration. 10 2 Noting that the First Circuit had
long been deciding claims of waiver by conduct in litigation,'0 3 the court began its
analysis of waiver with the FAA. °4 Under the language of section 3 of the FAA,
a stay of proceedings requires the court to address the waiver issue. 105 Admitting
that section 4 contains no such language, the court nonetheless found no reason to
interpret the sections differently, relying on the analysis of Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,106 where the Supreme Court found that Congress intended the narrow analysis of section 4 be applied to section 3, and Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo,10 7 where the Second Circuit postulated that waiver developed as an equitable defense to a motion under section 4.108 Implicitly, the court
reasoned that the "not in default" determination of section 3 is contemplated by
section 4.109
The First Circuit then articulated three policy reasons why Howsam and
Green Tree do not upset the traditional rule that courts decide waiver by conduct
in litigation. First, the Marie court posits, a court has inherent power to control its
docket and to prevent abuse in its proceedings (i.e. forum shopping)." 0 Where
litigation activity has occurred before a particular federal court, that court is the
most appropriate forum in which to decide the waiver issue."'
Second, the Marie court found, courts have comparatively more expertise in
recognizing such abuses, and in controlling for them." 2 A party's conduct in
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc., v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1967)).
100. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84-85.
101. Marie, 402 F.3d at 11 (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84-85).
102. Id. at 11-12.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 12-13; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
105. Marie, 402 F.3d at 12-13 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3).
106. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
107. 66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995).
108. Marie, 402 F.3d at 13 (citing Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 403-04; Distajo, 66 F.3d at 456-57). The
Marie court argued that the "default" inquiry of § 3 should be read into § 4, thus enlarging the realm of
possible inquiries into which a court may delve. Id. Prima Paint,however, did the reverse-the Court
read the narrow terms of § 4 into § 3, reducing the power of federal courts. Prima Paint,388 U.S. at
403-04.
109. Marie, 402 F.3d at 13 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4). The court's discussion in this respect is largely
dictum, as Allied did not move the court to compel arbitration under § 4, but to stay Marie's lawsuit
under § 3, which does contain the "default" inquiry.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Id. (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85; Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 452-53).
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litigation "heavily implicates 'judicial proceedings"' rather than arbitral proceedings, a factor stressed in Green Tree, and is not likely to engage the court in the
merits of the dispute. 1 3 Presumably, the implication of these first two arguments
is that, as a matter of contract interpretation, parties are more likely to1 expect a
court, rather than an arbitrator, to decide waiver by conduct in litigation. 14
Third, the court reasoned that, to the extent Howsam and Green Tree seek to
avoid delay and promote speedy resolution of disputes, efficiency concerns demand that a court determine waiver by conduct in litigation."l 5 Normally, the
court said, "gateway issues" like limitations periods will bar both arbitration and
litigation of a dispute. 116 But where the issue is waiver due to litigation activity,
by its nature the possibility of litigation remains, and referring the question to an
arbitrator would be an additional, unnecessary step.11 7 The Marie court thus held
that Howsam and Green Tree left undisturbed the presumption that waiver by
conduct in litigation lies properly before a court, contrary to the holdings in other
circuits."' 1'9

113. Id. (citing Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 452-53).
114. See id.; see also Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83; Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 452.
115. Marie, 402 F.3d at 13-14.
116. Id. at 14. Litigation would be barred by the contractual obligation to arbitrate, and full arbitration would be barred by whatever procedural condition precedent the arbitrator found was not fulfilled
(like the contractual time limitation in this case). In other words, if an arbitrator decided in favor of a
laches-type defense, further arbitration would be barred, as well as any litigation of the same issue
under the principles of res judicata.
117. Marie, 402 F.3d at 13-14.
118. Id. at 14. Allied argued that this presumption was overcome by the following contract language:
"Employer and employee agree to submit to final and binding arbitration any and all disputes, claims
... and disagreements concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement ... including the
arbitrability of any such controversy or claim ..... Id. at 14-15. Given that 'clear and unmistakable
evidence' is required to overcome the presumption, the appellate court found that this very general
language did not shift the question of waiver to the arbitrator. Id. at 15.
119. On the merits, the court determined that Allied had not, in fact, waived its contractual right to
arbitrate by participating in the EEOC investigation or by failing to initiate arbitration during the
pendency of those proceedings, relying heavily on EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
Marie, 402 F.3d at 15-17.
In Waffle House, the Supreme Court reconciled the FAA with the authority granted to the EEOC in
Title VII. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 279-80. In that case, the EEOC brought a public enforcement
action against Waffle House for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101 - 12181 (1994), on behalf of a former Waffle House employee seeking both injunctive and
make-whole relief. Id. After extensively dealing with the legislative histories of both the FAA and
the EEOC's authority, the Court found that under the clear terms of Title Vu, an employee has no
independent cause of action once the EEOC decides to file on its own. Id. at 285-89, 291. A public
enforcement action is not merely a derivative suit of the employee's, and so the employee cannot bind
the EEOC by signing an arbitration action. Id. at 297-98.
The Marie court extended this analysis and found that an employer would be unable to stop either
EEOC investigations or proceedings by invoking an arbitration agreement because the EEOC is not a
party to an agreement to arbitrate between employer and employee. Marie, 402 F.3d at 15-16 (citing
Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297-98). It would be a waste of resources, the court concluded, for courts to
require an employer to preemptively begin a duplicative arbitration proceeding when the results of
EEOC involvement may well end the dispute. Id. at 16. For example, the EEOC investigation may
lead the complaining party to realize the lack of merit in his or her claim and to abandon it. Id. In
Marie, because no waiver was found, and because the issue of contractual time limitation must have
been reserved for the arbitrator, the court remanded the case to the district court for an order compelling arbitration. Id. at 17.
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Marie begins to answer a question largely ignored prior to, and in many cases
even after, the decisions of Howsam and Green Tree. In articulating three policy
reasons why courts are better suited to decide waiver,' 20 the court makes a strong
case for judicial adjudication of waiver by conduct in litigation in a manner that
satisfies the concerns of the Supreme Court.
V. COMMENT
To some, extensive treatment of whether courts or arbitrators hear issues of
waiver may seem superfluous. After all, as the Marie court notes, federal courts
have long been the arbiters of waiver resulting from litigation conduct.12 ' Accordingly, several circuits have continued to apply the traditional rule without even
mentioning Green Tree or Howsam. 1 2 What Marie stands for, then, is a rebuttal
to those courts, like the Eighth Circuit and Eastern District of Pennsylvania identified by Marie, who may rely
123 too heavily on Supreme Court dicta where waiver is
only mentioned in passing.
In the vast majority of cases decided subsequent to Green Tree, courts that
left waiver questions for arbitrators rested their holdings on facts in which the
party seeking arbitration had not invoked the "litigation machinery," but had only
delayed in compelling arbitration. 124 The holdings in these cases would be unchanged by the analysis of Marie. Failure to seek arbitration within a contractual
time limitation, for instance, is a question presumed to be for the arbitrator, just as
the Marie court found. 125 Even in cases where a party asserts waiver by delay,
absent an agreed-upon time limitation, courts applying the traditional rule upheld
26
by Marie would still reject the defense, and proceed in compelling arbitration.
In arbitration, the complaining
party would be free to again assert waiver by delay
127
before the arbitrator.
Only in two cases, Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. 128 and Belleview Drug Co., 129 did a
court find that, despite litigation conduct, the issue of waiver was still for an arbi120. The policy concerns in Marie can be reduced to three: the inherent powers of courts, relative
expertise, and efficiency. See Marie, 402 F.3d at 11-14.
121. See id. at I 1-12; see also Matthew Forsythe, The Treatment Arbitration Waivers Under Federal
Law, DIsP. RESOL. J., May 2000, at 8, 18.
122. See, e.g., Alejandro v. L.S. Holding Co., 130 Fed. Appx. 544 (3d Cir. 2005); Batory v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. 124 Fed. Appx. 530 (9th Cir. 2005); Glazer v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 394 F.3d 444 (6th

Cir. 2005). In fact, some circuits consider the issue too obvious to publish as precedent, as evidenced
by their cases being published in the Federal Appendix, as opposed to the Federal Reporter.
123. See ADRWorld.com, First Circuit Deepens Split Over Arbitration Waivers, March 21, 2005,
http://www.adrworld.consp.asp?id=38148 [hereinafter, ADRWorld.com].
124. See Smith v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 2004 WL 1859623 (6th Cir. 2004); Pro Tech Indus.,
Inc. v. URS Corp., 377 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2004); Mulvaney Mechanical, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n, 351 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2003).
125. Marie, 402 F.3d at 11.
126. See Restoration Preservation Masonry, Inc. v. Grove Europe Ltd., 325 F.3d 54, 61 (st Cir.
2003) (requiring prejudice beyond mere delay); Gulf Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. General Life Ins.
Co., 304 F.3d 476,484 (5th Cir. 2002) (requiring inconsistent acts beyond mere delay).
127. Assuming that the arbitrator does not employ a collateral estoppel-type principle, nothing this
author is aware of bars a party from asserting the same argument in arbitration that it argued in front of
a judge before being compelled to arbitration.
128. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 328 F.3d 462 (8th Cir. 2003).
129. Belleview Drug Co. v. Advance PCS, 333 F. Supp. 2d 318 (E.D.Pa 2004).
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trator. The courts in those cases examined Howsam no further than to include in
their holdings the oft-quoted line that "the presumption is that the arbitrator should
decide allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."'' 30 The issue
in Howsam was a contractual time limitation and had little to do with the party's
use of a judicial forum.' 31 Thus, mere inclusion of waiver in the Supreme Court's
exemplar list of issues presumed to be for an arbitrator was not necessary to the
holding in Howsam, and should not be determinative.
Instead of relying on dicta as the Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. and Belleview courts
seem to have done, the Marie court addressed the policy reasons behind the Supreme Court's decisions, and applied those policies to a substantially different
form of waiver than was taken up in Howsam. That is, the Marie court looked at
litigation conduct as opposed to mere delay. As a matter of contract interpretation, and in light of the likely intent of the parties, the court says, courts should
decide whether a party has waived its right to arbitration. 32 The sound reasoning
of Marie will likely serve as an analytical roadmap for other circuits presented
with similar issues of waiver, and will help resolve 1the
33 differences in approach
caused by cases like Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. and Belleview.
Rather than making a distinction between two types of waiver and using the
same term for both, perhaps the "split" in authority could better be resolved by
abandoning the "waiver" terminology altogether. Instead, one could apply the
existing principles of two separate equitable defenses closely related to their
"waiver" counterparts, yet dissimilar enough from each other that courts would
avoid the temptation to send both defenses to arbitration. The distinction between
types of waiver defenses recognized in Marie is already encompassed in two existing equitable defenses: laches and judicial estoppel.
Where one party defends a motion to compel arbitration either on the grounds
that the contractual time limitation in which to bring the claim has lapsed, or on
the grounds of simple delay absent such an agreement, the appropriate defense
would be laches. 34 Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, this defense is for an arbitrator.' 35 It heavily implicates issues of procedural arbitrability,
and is most like the case in Howsam. Furthermore, the parties are likely to expect
a laches variety defense to be made in front of an arbitrator, given the relative
expertise an arbitrator would have in controlling her own processes.
A party would argue judicial estoppel, on the other hand, where a court has
relied on an apparent choice of the moving party to proceed not with arbitration,
but with litigation. Judicial estoppel is designed to protect the integrity of the
judicial process, and "generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a
case on an argument, and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail on
another phase."' 36 Courts applying the principle of judicial estoppel usually re130. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 328 F.3d at 466 (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84); Belleview Drug Co., 333 F.
Supp. 2d at 324 (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84).
131. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 79.
132. See Marie, 402 F.3d at 12-15.
133. See ADRWorld.com, supra note 123.
134. Laches is an equitable defense that one's party opponent has unreasonably delayed in pursuing a
right or claim; this is also referred to as "sleeping on one's rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 891
(8th ed. 2004). The focus of a laches defense is the passage of time, rather than inconsistent conduct.
135. See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
136. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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quire the existence of a number of factors: whether a party's later position is
clearly inconsistent from the first; whether the prior position was successful, risking the perception that the court was at some time "misled;" and whether the party
asserting the inconsistent position will derive an unfair
advantage or impose an
37
unfair detriment to the opposing party if not estopped. 1
Waiver in the form of judicial estoppel would be limited to the holding in
Marie; a court would only determine waiver of the judicial estoppel variety where
the complained-of conduct (or argument) occurred in litigation. By its terms,
judicial estoppel is limited to litigation conduct, as it is the court that must appear
to have been misled. By proceeding first with litigation and then asking a court to
compel arbitration, the prior position is clearly inconsistent. The "success" inquiry for judicial estoppel is the same as the inconsistent act requirement of the
traditional waiver rule. The extent to which a party invokes the "litigation machinery" is the extent to which the prior position, litigation, is successful. The
"unfair advantage" inquiry bears striking resemblance to the prejudice requirement of the traditional waiver rule, and correlates with both forms of prejudice
that courts may find in waiver situations: forum-shopping with unfair advantage,
and undue expense with unfair detriment to the opposing party. The court
would
38
then be "judicially estopped" from enforcing the arbitration provision.'
By utilizing a different body of equitable remedies, courts would be less apt
to confuse the general language in Howsam with the specific application of a substantially different concept than was dealt with in that case.'
Hopefully, the
sound reasoning in Marie will be a strong influence for resolving the differences
among the federal circuits. But where a federal court refuses to hear waiver allegations that it believes are presumptively for an arbitrator, a party should argue
judicial estoppel instead. A court would have a hard time sending the parties to an
arbitrator for judicial estoppel.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court twice emphasized the narrowness of the realm of possible
inquiries into which the federal courts may engage before sending a case to arbitration. Although it was once quite common for courts to hear defenses of waiver
when a party sought to compel arbitration, several courts reversed their positions
and deemed all questions of waiver appropriate only for an arbitrator. The First
Circuit in Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp. provided an analytical framework that came to the opposite conclusion, but more closely followed the concerns of the Supreme Court: expectations of the parties, and relative expertise of
courts versus arbitrators. Given the depth of the First Circuit's reasoning, it is
likely that Marie will be the rule that future circuits presented with the issue will
137. Id. at 750.
138. Not so coincidentally, judicial estoppel in this context comports with the FAA as well. To the
extent that judicial estoppel may be used to refuse enforcement of any contract term, § 2 of the FAA
renders arbitration provisions enforceable, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
139. Howsam dealt with a contractual time limitation and included waiver in its list of issues presumptively for an arbitrator. See Howsam, 537 U.S. 79. As the Marie court showed, litigation conduct
is entirely different from arbitration conduct. See Marie,402 F.3d at 1.
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follow. This author suggests, though, that an alternative framework exists in laches and judicial estoppel. Arguing these defenses, instead, avoids the potentially
confusing distinction that must currently be made between two types of waiver,
and conforms to more palatable equitable principles.
DAVID LEFEvRE
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